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I. STATUS
A.

SAME-SEX UNION

AME-sex unions, whether formal or informal, are unrecognized
under Texas law.1 The Houston appellate courts are equally resolute in that regard. 2 In a matter before the First Court of Appeals a
man accused of sexual assault of a male child asserted that the child was
his spouse. In rejecting that argument, the court stated that under Texas
law persons of the same sex cannot be issued a marriage license, nor can
they be considered informally married. 3 In a case before the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals, the court rejected the argument that a marriage-like
relationship existed between the accused and his alleged victim: "Our
State's public policy is unambiguous, clear, and controlling on the question of creating a new equitable remedy akin to marriage[;] we may not
create such a remedy."' 4 Despite this unwavering position in most American jurisdictions, the issue of same-sex marriage continues to be the subject of academic debate and discussion. 5 Informal marriages of
heterosexual couples, 6 however, often present little difficulty of
recognition.
B.

INFORMAL MARRIAGE

7

In Joplin v. Borusheski, the court considered the factual sufficiency of
evidence that a couple had agreed to a common law marriage. As a general rule, unless divorce proceedings are commenced within two years of
the date on which the parties to the alleged informal marriage ceased
living together, Texas law recognizes a rebuttable presumption that the
parties did not enter into an agreement to be married. 8 This presumption
may be rebutted by proof (1) that the couple agreed to be married, (2)
that after the agreement they lived together in Texas as husband and wife,
and (3) that they represented to others that they were married. 9 The Joplin case illustrates that an agreement sufficient to rebut the presumption
must be more than a vague assertion. In that case, the former cohabitants
1. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 2006) (persons of the same sex may
not be issued a license for a ceremonial marriage); § 2.401(a) (an informal marriage may be
contracted by a man and a woman).
2. Billodeau v. State, 263 S.W.3d 318, 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007),
rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

3. Id.
4. Id.; Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006,
no pet.).
5. See, e.g., Ronald S. Allen & Michael Clarkson, Same-Sex Marriage& Civil Unions:
'Til State Borders Do Us Part?,36 THE BRIEF 54 (2007); Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The
Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247
(2007); Roger Severino, Or For Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 939 (2007).
6. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401.
7. 244 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
8. Id. at 611.
9. Id. at 610.
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attempted to prove the agreement to be married with evidence that the
couple had come to an oral understanding shortly after the female former
cohabitant was diagnosed as having a brain tumor. 10 He testified that
"[s]he asked me to be there for the last piece of dirt, to make sure she had
lilies put on her grave and I promised her that."11 Although a more precise oral agreement to be married would have been sufficient, the court
concluded that the male former cohabitant's promise to stay with the female former cohabitant through her illness could not be construed as an
12
agreement to be married.
13
Proof of an informal marriage was also at issue in Freeman v. State.
In that instance a criminal prisoner argued that the trial court erred by
compelling his wife to testify contrary to the applicable rule of spousal
privilege. Freeman and his alleged wife were ceremonially married on
February 22, 2002,14 six days after Freeman was alleged to have shot a
man in retribution for stealing crack cocaine from his apartment. 15 At his
trial Freeman sought to disqualify his wife from testifying on the basis of
spousal privilege. There was conflicting evidence concerning whether at
the time of the shooting Freeman and his alleged wife had agreed to be
married and were representing to others that they were married. Several
witnesses produced by the prisoner testified that they understood that he
and his alleged wife were married, that they conducted themselves as a
16
married couple, and that the man treated the woman's son as his own.
Other evidence, however, was inconsistent with the alleged intent to form
an informal marital union: when questioned by the police two days after
the shooting, the woman referred to Freeman as her boyfriend, and although she admitted that the two lived together, in all other correspondences with the police she referred to Freeman merely by name rather
than as her husband. Further, in an apartment lease executed by Freeman's alleged wife in August 2001, she indicated "not applicable" in the
space allotted for spouse. 17 The court, therefore, found that the trial
court did not go astray in ruling that no common law marriage existed
before the ceremonial marriage on February 22, 2002.18
C.

MARRIAGE IN SERIES

"When two or more marriages of a person to different spouses are alleged, the most recent marriage is presumed to be valid as against each
marriage that precedes the most recent marriage until one who asserts
the validity of a prior marriage proves [its] validity."' 19 Thus, the women
10. Id. at 611.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 611-12.
13. 230 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.-Eastand 2007, pet. ref'd).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

402.
397.
402.
403.

19. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN.

§ 1.102 (Vernon 2006).
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who claimed a common law marriage to the same decedent in Romano v.
Newell Recycling of San Antonio, LP were required to rebut that presumption. 20 In such a case one might expect a seamy record of lies and
betrayal, but the facts in Romano are far cleaner and simpler. The former
husband's relationship with his first alleged wife spanned the nine-year
21
period from 1990 to 1999, during which time the couple lived together.
The second alleged wife claimed that her relationship with him began in
1998 and lasted until the man's death in 2005.22 The man had died intes-

tate after an on-the-job accident on the premises of his employer, the
defendant.2 3 Following his death, both the first alleged wife and the second alleged wife claimed to be the sole heir of his estate. 24 After the
second alleged former wife filed an application to determine heirship, the
employer intervened because of litigation related to the incident in which
the former husband was killed. 25 The court stated that though the presumption of validity of a recent marriage is "one of the strongest ...
known to law," 26 the presumption may be rebutted by proof of a prior

valid marriage that had been established and not dissolved.2 7 With respect to the asserted first marriage, the court considered evidence of (1)
the couple's agreement to be married, (2) cohabitation as husband and
wife, and (3) whether the couple represented to others that they were
married. 28 According to the first alleged wife, she and the man had
agreed to be married shortly after beginning to live together in 1990.29
"[Such] testimony, if unchallenged [is] sufficient to establish an agreement to be married," but, in this case, the second alleged wife contested
the truth of the testimony. 30 She contended that documents such as the
man's loan application, a deed of trust, and a non-beneficiary affidavit all
described him as single. 31 These facts alone, however, were not sufficient
to negate the agreement to enter into a common law marriage. 32 There
was also extensive evidence of cohabitation between the alleged first wife
and the man she asserted was her deceased husband. 33 Although the second alleged wife indicated that she and the man had begun to live together in 1998, the court determined that the man's absences from his
"first wife" were temporary and were consistent in time to alleged fights
20. No. 04-07-00084-CV, 2008 WL 227974, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 30,
2008, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *3(quoting Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 122 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, pet. denied)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at *4-5.
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *5.
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between the first couple. 34 The court observed that brief absences from
the marital home do not negate cohabitation and that the first alleged
wife had therefore satisfied the cohabitation requirement. 3 5 Although
there were conflicts with respect to evidence of public representations of
marriage, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
a finding that the first couple had been married. 36 In the absence of evidence of a divorce dissolving the first marriage, that marriage subsisted
until the man's death. 37 Therefore, an informal marriage between the
38
former husband and his alleged second wife could not have occurred.
As a result, the alleged first wife was the proper beneficiary of the de39
ceased husband's intestate estate.

D.

CONTRIVED DIVORCE

In Hall v. Hall,40 the issue was not the validity of a marriage, but the
validity of a divorce. 41 In response to his former wife's claim for delinquent child-support, the former husband sought an offset for the amounts
he had expended to support his wife after their divorce. According to his
testimony, his only notice of the divorce proceedings was a card he received in the mail from the district clerk. 42 Although the former wife
indicated that her former husband had always been aware of the divorce
proceeding, the ex-husband testified that he had neither signed a waiver
of citation nor agreed to the divorce. 43 According to the former husband,
his former wife had simply obtained an ex-parte divorce to protect her
assets from judgment creditors. 44 The former wife stated that she had
explained to her former husband that no child support had been ordered,
joint custody of the children had been awarded to her, all debts were
placed in the former wife's name, and that it was understood that they
would remarry once the judgment creditors were taken care of.4 5 The

couple had continued to live together and the former husband continued
to support his former wife and children. When the former wife initiated
suit to recover back child-support payments, the former husband asserted
a common law marriage as a defense. But he was unable to show proof
of a declaration or registration of an informal marriage and ultimately did
not contest the legitimacy of the divorce proceedings. 46 On the wife's
appeal, the court relied on estoppel to grant the former husband an offset
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id. at *6.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. No. 09-06-206-CV, 2007 WL 2127133, at *3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont July 26, 2007,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).
41. Id. at *1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *2 n.3.
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for sums expended while he lived with his former wife. 47
II.

CHARACTERIZATION
A.

INCEPTION OF TITLE

While the couple in In re Kluth4 8 were living together prior to their
marriage, the man deposited about $3,800 of his future wife's money into
an account that held his funds and then purchased a car using that account. In the divorce that followed some months after the marriage, the
trial court held that the car was community property and the husband
appealed. 49 On appeal the wife argued that she was entitled to a refund
of her deposited funds but did not assert ownership of the car. 50 In this
confused posture of the case, the Texarkana Court of Appeals, without
commenting on the wife's claim, reversed the trial court's decree and re51
manded the case for a new division of the property.
The wife argued in Marriageof Jordan that the court abused its discretion by imposing an owelty lien in the husband's favor in order to satisfy
the husband's claim for economic contribution under section 3.403, utilizing the statutory formula that the husband's interest in the farm was
based on his separate property estate's contributions to the extent of seventy-two percent of the fair market value of the land.52 The trial court
had awarded him seventy-two percent of the farm's fair market value and
half of the claimed community interest for a total of $15,930. 53 The appellate court found that the husband's calculations were not supported by
the evidence because he had commingled certain funds from which he
claimed to have made a separate contribution and had failed to provide
54
evidence of the net equity interest in the farm at the time of marriage.
To demonstrate a perceived flaw in the formula in section 3.403, the court
conducted its own analysis of the separate and community contributions
to the purchase, finding that the husband's economic contribution
amounted to seventy-five percent of the fair market value of the five
acres. 55 The court also calculated the community estate's economic contribution, with the husband's resulting share equaling sixty-nine percent
of the fair market value. Therefore, the court wondered how the husband's separate property interest and the community interest could total
more than one hundred percent.5 6 The court held that this conclusion
resulted from a failure of the section 3.403 formula to take into account
47. Id. at *4.
48. No. 06-07-00129-CV, 2008 WL 2150961 (Tex. App.-Texarkana May 23, 2009, no
pet.) (not designated for publication).
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id. at *3.
52. 264 S.W.3d 850, 858-59 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.).
53. Id. at 860, 860 n.12.
54. Id. at 860-61.
55. Id. at 862.
56. Id.

2009]

Husband and Wife

1155

situations in which both the community property estate and a separate
property estate make economic contributions. 57 The court concluded
that when two marital estates make an economic contribution to a third
marital estate, the formula established by section 3.403 should be modified by including the economic contributions made by both of the contributing marital estates into the denominator of the formula in section
3.403(b) and (b-i). 58 Applying this formula to the issue at hand, the court
determined that the husband's separate property contribution was fortynine percent of the land's fair market value ($9,739), while the community estate's contribution was thirty-six percent of the farm's fair market
value ($7,130). Thus, a total claim for the husband's entitlement for economic contribution amounted to $13,304 ($9,739 plus one-half of the
community, $3,565). 59 As the court previously noted, however, the husband had failed to provide sufficient evidence for the calculation of his
claim for contribution. As a result, the court of appeals held that the trial
60
court had erroneously imposed a lien on the wife's separate property.
61
The case was reversed and remanded.
B.
1.

PARTITIONS AND EXCHANGES

PremaritalAgreements

In Ahmed v. Ahmed, 62 the ex-husband appealed a decision granting a
divorce and awarding the ex-wife $50,000 pursuant to an Islamic marriage
contract. The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded. 63 The spouses in this case were married in a civil ceremony in November 1999, but it was not until six months later that they
went through the Islamic marriage ceremony. Part of the ceremony required the spouses to sign an Islamic marriage certificate, including a socalled Mahr agreement. 6 4 A Mahr agreement is an Islamic-law device
which essentially creates a contractually obligated marriage dower with
two parts.6 5 The first part of the dower is paid to the wife by the groom
upon marriage. The second part, and the one at issue in this case, is paid
to the wife upon divorce. The purpose of this second part is to create a
disincentive to divorce and to provide for the wife should a divorce occur. 66 In this case, the Mahr agreement stipulated that should divorce
occur, the husband would pay the wife $50,000.67 The couple divorced
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 863.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. 261 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

63. Id.
64. Id. at 193.
65. Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptialsand Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL.

L.

REV.

189, 197 (2002).

66. Id. at 200-01.
67. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d at 193.
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five years after the marriage and the trial court awarded the wife the
$50,000 as liquidated damages, holding that the Mahr agreement was a
valid marital contract executed "in contemplation of a forthcoming
marriage. "68
On appeal, the former husband argued, and the court agreed, that the
Mahr agreement could not be enforced as a premarital agreement because the parties signed the agreement after the civil ceremony. 69 In doing so, the court rejected the former wife's argument that the date of the
religious ceremony should control. 70 In response to the wife's argument,
the court noted that Texas "does not distinguish between civil and religious marriage ceremonies. 71a As far as the State of Texas is concerned,
the couple achieved their marital status upon completion of their civil
ceremony. 72 As a result, any contract formed after that point could not
possibly have the character of "premarital" or "in contemplation of a
forthcoming marriage. ' 73 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the
74
trial court erred in enforcing the contract.
The former wife argued, alternatively, that the agreement could be enforced as a marital partition and exchange agreement under section
4.102. 75 In response, the ex-husband argued that the terms were too
vague or uncertain to be enforced as either a premarital or marital agreement. 76 The court rejected the husband's argument, reasoning that because both parties were reared in the Islamic faith and because the
agreement was a custom of faith, both parties had sufficient understanding of the terms. 77 However, the court held that the evidence was too
slight to conclude that the agreement constituted a valid marital partition
and exchange agreement. 78 Statutory requirements for such agreements
require, among other things, intent to convert community property into
separate property. 79 In order to best serve justice, the court reversed the
$50,000 award and remanded the case to allow the former wife to prove
80
that the agreement was enforceable on whatever grounds she could.
2.

Marital Agreements

The executor of a wife's estate brought suit against the executor of her
husband's estate seeking a declaratory judgment that certain securities
were not owned by the spouses with a right of survivorship and, there68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.

at 194.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.102 (Vernon 2006)).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 195.
at 196.
at 195.
at 195-96.
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fore, did not pass from the wife to the husband upon the wife's death.81
The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that a right of
survivorship did not exist in a brokerage account and in certain other
stocks held on his account certificates. 82 In Beatty v. Holmes and its companion case, Holmes v. Beatty,83 the court considered several issues of
first impression relating to whether or not a right of survivorship was created in a brokerage account and certain securities which originated in it,
but were subsequently removed from other brokerage accounts. The executor of the wife brought an appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
84
ruling that a right of survivorship had been created.
The wife and the husband died in 1999 and 2000 respectively. During
their marriage they had acquired a number of brokerage accounts using
community funds. Together the spouses also owned several securities
that had been removed from their brokerage accounts. The value of
these holdings was in the millions of dollars. 85 The wife's executor sued
the husband's executor seeking judgment that the holdings at issue were
not owned with a right of survivorship and, thus, did not pass to the husband's estate upon his wife's death. Accordingly, the wife's executor argued that the holdings were community property and sought a one-half
interest in them. 8 6 The husband's executor filed a counterclaim, arguing
that a right of survivorship did exist and filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion in part, declaring
that a right of survivorship existed and thus, that the wife's estate had no
interest in either the brokerage account or the thirty-six securities issued
out of various securities accounts that were subsequently held during the
marriage in certificate form.8 7 The wife's executor appealed on the
88
ground that the securities were not subject to a right of survivorship.
Sections 451 and 452 of the Probate Code provide for spousal survivorship agreements of their community property and the formalities for
achieving that result. 89 The couple had each executed a "Joint Account
Agreement" using a printed form provided by the broker and signed by
both spouses. 90 In doing so, however, the spouses failed to follow the
instructions embodied in the instrument by which the creation of a joint
tenancy would be achieved. The court agreed with the wife's executor's
argument that the spouses' failure to make an affirmative choice of the
81. Beatty v. Holmes (Beatty 1), 233 S.W.3d 475,478 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2007), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 07-0784, 07-0785, 2009 WL 1817398 (Tex. Jun. 26,

2009).
82. Id. at 494.
83. Holmes v. Beatty (Beatty 1I), 233 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2007).

84. Beatty I, 233 S.W.3d at 479.
85. Id. at 478.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 479.
89. Id. at 479-80 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 451-452 (Vernon 2003 & Supp.

2006)).
90. Id. at 480.
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results sought demonstrated the absence of the mutual intent necessary
to create a right of survivorship in the account. 91 Thus, because the
'agreement did not clearly reflect intents to own the account with a right
92
of survivorship," no right of survivorship was created.
The deceased wife's estate argued that the situation was analogous to a
line of cases which reached the same conclusion involving section 439(a)
in Part 1 of Chapter XI, "Multiple-Party Accounts. ' 93 The court noted
that the cases cited presented situations different from the one under con94
sideration, but nonetheless found two of the cited cases informative.
The cases of Estate of Graffagnino95 and Ephran v. Frazier96 involved
signature cards on which joint account holders failed to mark either the
checkbox for right of survivorship or the checkbox for ownership without
such a right. The court observed that the cases of Graffagnino and
Ephran differed from Beatty in that those two cases presented an option
for marking a box rather than marking out a passage in order to effect a
choice, but it found that the former cases were nonetheless informative to
the point that they "instruct that the parties clearly express within the
written agreement their intent to choose a survivorship option. '97 The
court found that such an intent was not clearly demonstrated in the account for their agreement and, thus, a right of survivorship was not created in accordance with section 452. 98
The husband's estate argued alternatively that the right of survivorship
was demonstrated by the inclusion of the abbreviation "JT TEN"
preceeding the name of each spouse in the title of the agreement. 99 The
court rejected that argument, observing that property may be owned as
joint tenants without rights of survivorship and that the inclusion of the
term was insufficient to make a determination of intent to create a right
of survivorship. 10 0 As a result, the court held that the trial court erred in
ruling that a right of survivorship was created in their account. 10 1
The deceased spouses had also held securities in certificate form and,
as to those, the court also agreed with the wife's executor's argument that
no right of survivorship existed. 10 2 The security-certificates had been issued out of various securities accounts, and thirty-four of those included
the term "JT TEN" preceding each spouses' name. On the back of these
certificates the meaning of the term: "JT TEN-as joint tenancy with
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
denied)
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 481, 483.
Id. at 481-82 n.7.
Id. at 483.
No. 09-00-434-CV, 2002 WL 31126901 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Sept. 26, 2002, pet.
(not designated for publication).
840 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
Beatty 1, 233 S.W.3d at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482.
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right of survivorship and not as tenancy in common.' 10 3 None of the certificates were signed by the spouses, which is not unusual as such instruments are not usually signed until they are about to be sold.1 0 4 The
direction of the spouses with respect to the survivorship of the account
applied only to the securities while they were held in the account. That
was the account in which the securities were held in certificate-form when
removed from the account. The securities were not themselves held with
a right of survivorship because section 450 of the Probate Code (located
in Part 2) cannot be used to create such a right in the community property, and the agreements applicable to the certificates did not govern the
character of the securities after being removed from the account in certif10 5
icate form.
Section 452 of Part 3 governs agreements to create rights of survivorship in community property exclusively. 10 6 No guidance as to its meaning
is to be found in Chapter XI of the Probate Code, which addresses interaction between it and section 450 and Part 3.107 The language of section
450 demonstrates that it is not intended to create a right of survivorship
in community property.' 0 8 Nowhere in the section is the creation of a
right of survivorship mentioned, nor does the section contain any mention of "survivOrship." 10 9 The language of section 450 contemplates a single party owning or controlling the property. 110 Section 450 does not
require any signature to effect a non-testamentary transfer, while Part 3
"emphatically requires" the signatures of both spouses to create a right of
survivorship in their community property."' Part 3 contains the controlling provisions.' 12 In enacting Part 3, the Legislature amended section 46
of the Texas Probate Code.1 1 3 That section expressly states that Part 3
governs agreements between spouses regarding rights of survivorship in
community property. 114 The court also found the San Antonio Court of
Appeals' reasoning in Haas v. Voigt persuasive. 115 There, the court held
that after 1987 a right of survivorship could only be created by first partitioning the community into separate property prior to creating a right of
survivorship or by an agreement as set forth in Part 3.116 The court also
found persuasive testimony before the Senate considering the legislation
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 487.
Id.
109. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 2003)).
110. Id. at 489.
111. Id. at 490 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 for the first proposition and §§ 45152 for the second proposition).

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id..(citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b)).
115. Id. at 487 (citing Haas v. Voigt, 940 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1996, writ denied).

116. Id.
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that would lead to the enactment of Part 3.117 That testimony indicated a
strong intent on the part of legislators to ensure that spouses go beyond
using designations on security certificates by requiring signatures to create rights of survivorship. 118 The court thus concluded that the draftsmen
did not consider section 450 as effective towards creating a right of survivorship in community property. 119 The court dismissed an argument by
the husband's estate that language in section 450, to the effect that it
would not invalidate provisions found on instruments such as the security
certificate, demonstrates that failure to comply with Part 3 would not invalidate the securities at issue. 120 The court determined that because section 450 was enacted prior to Part 3, its language could not have been
intended to act upon it.121 Any such language would instead affect the
testamentary provisions of the Code and not Part 3.122
C.

TRACING

In Perez v. Perez123 three certificates of deposits held in the husband's
name were at issue. The evidence showed that all of these deposits had
been made prior to marriage and that, until the wife petitioned for dil2 4
vorce, the only activity in those accounts was the accrual of interest.
The husband argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the trial court
had erred by mischaracterizing the entire amount on deposit as community property. 125 The court noted that the original amounts deposited
should have been characterized as separate and the interest accrued during marriage as community. 126 But these conclusions were not dispositive
of the matter.' 27 The husband's sister, also named on the accounts as a
depositor, had withdrawn the entire amount on deposit immediately after
the wife petitioned for divorce. 128 The trial court's decree did not consider any possible claim against the sister. Thus, the value of the accounts
in question effectively stood at zero. The court of appeals found that the
mischaracterization had only a de minimis effect on the division of the
29
estate, and the husband's appeal was denied.
Tracing property to determine its community or separate character may
require a high level of proof to determine the ultimate division on termi117. Id. at 491-92 (citing Hearing on Tex. S.B. 1643 Before the Senate Jurisprudence
Comm., 71st Leg., R.S. 33-34 (May 4, 1989)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 492-93; see also Elizabeth Williams, InterspousalAgreements and Transfers, 3
TEX. FAM. L. SERV. § 24:22 (West 1999).
120. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 2003)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Perez v. Perez, No. 09-06-521-CV, 2007 WL 5187895 (Tex. App.-Beaumont May
22, 2008, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
124. Id. at *2-3.
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *1.
129. Id. at *3.
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nation of a marriage. 130 Granger v. Granger deals with division on the
death of a husband who had provided two large insurance policies for the
benefit of various members of his family. One of these was wholly paid
for with community funds and the proceeds were therefore equally divided between the beneficiaries and the surviving widow.' 31 The origin of
the funds with which the premiums on the other policy was paid required
a substantial sifting of evidence to determine whether the widow would
share in the proceeds. The insurance carrier deposited the proceeds of
the policy in the registry of the court, and the trial court found that the
policy had been purchased with separate funds and therefore, the named
beneficiaries took the proceeds.1 32 On the widow's appeal, the decision
of the trial judge was affirmed. 133 At the time the policy was purchased
in 2003, both the bank statements of the late husband and testimony offered at the trial showed that the entire income of the insured was derived from social security benefits. 134 Following the rule of federal
the husband's separate
supremacy, therefore, the policy paid for with 35
funds passed wholly according to his directions.'
In Von Hohn v. Von Hohn136 both parties filed for divorce in July 2004,
but could not agree on the extent of their community property interest in
the law firm of which the husband was a member. The firm members had
entered into a partnership agreement that included a formula for calculating each partner's interest in the partnership at the date of the partner's death, retirement, or withdrawal, but the agreement was silent as to
the proper formula for a calculating a partnership interest on divorce.
The trial court allowed, in part, testimony by the wife's valuation expert,
asserting that the community property interest could be evaluated by
means other than those included in the partnership agreement. The trial
court allowed the jury to consider two years of the firm's projected future
earnings in determining the husband's interest in the firm.
The husband asserted that: (1) the wife's valuation expert did not qualify as such under the Rules of Evidence, 137 (2) the method of valuation
proposed by the expert was based on unreliable methods, analysis, and
principles, and (3) there was no evidence that the expert's methodology
in valuing a law firm was used by other valuation experts. 138 The court
overruled these objections after the expert produced evidence at a pretrial hearing that he had the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, train130. See, e.g., Granger v. Granger, 236 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, pet.
denied) (noting that the testimonial evidence alone was insufficient proof for tracing).
131. Id. at 854.
132. Id. at 854, 859.
133. Id. at 855, 859.
134. Id. at 859.
135. See, e.g., id. at 857.
136. 260 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.).

137. See id. at 635.

TEXAS RULE EVIDENCE

702 contains three requirements for the

admission of expert testimony: "(1) the witness must be qualified, (2) the proposed testimony must be scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, and (3) the testimony
must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
138. Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d at 635.
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ing, or education regarding the specific issue [of valuation]" to satisfy the
trial court that he qualified as an expert under rule 702139 and under the
United States Supreme Court's standards for the admission of expert testimony in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.140 He also testified that the income approach to valuation that he had used had also
been used with respect to the same firm twenty-five years prior to this
case in another suit for divorce. 141 The appellate court therefore concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert to testify regarding his valuation of the husband's interest in the
14 2
firm.
The husband also argued that his interest in the firm was defined by the
partnership agreement and that the community estate was not entitled to
a greater interest than that to which he was entitled in the firm's commercial goodwill. Relying on Finn v. Finn,143 the husband argued that the
extent of his interest in the firm's goodwill, if any, was governed by the
partnership agreement. As in Finn,144 the partnership agreement did not
provide any compensation for goodwill accrued to a partner when he
ceased to practice law with the firm because of death or voluntary departure, nor did it provide any other mechanism to realize the value of the
firm's goodwill. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Finn145 was later
adopted by another court, providing the precedential basis for the court's
analysis in Von Hohn. The court noted, however, that a firm's goodwill is
an asset of the partnership as it exists as an ongoing business entity in
which the husband-partner participates, and when valued as such, it not
only has a commercial value but is also considered intangible property
that can be valued on divorce. 146 In the court's opinion, the fact that the
partnership agreement was silent on a contingency for the valuation of
goodwill in the event of divorce merely reinforced the conclusion that
other types of valuation could be used. 147 As the court noted, the law
firm "was an ongoing partnership as of the time of divorce, [the husband]
had not died nor had he withdrawn from the partnership, and, thus, none
139. Id. at 637.
140. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
141. Van Hohn, 260 S.W.3d at 639 (citing Finn v. Finn, 658 S.W.2d 735, 741 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
142. Id. at 638.
143. Finn, 658 S.W.2d 735.
144. In Finn, the court concluded that a two-part test determines whether goodwill attaches to a professional practice that is subject to division upon divorce: (1) goodwill must
be determined to exist independently of the personal ability of the professional spouse and
(2) if such goodwill is found to exist, then it must be determined whether that goodwill has
a commercial value in which the community estate is entitled to share. Id. at 741. The court
determined that the community estate was not entitled to a greater interest in the firm's
goodwill than that to which the husband (in that case) was entitled and that the extent of
his interest was, therefore, governed by the partnership agreement. Id.

145. Id. at 749 (Stewart, J., concurring). This concurring opinion was adopted by the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Keith v. Keith, 763 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1989, no writ).

146. Von Hohn, 260 S.W.3d at 639.
147. Id. at 640.
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of the triggering events specified in the partnership agreement had occurred. '148 The court therefore concluded that the trial court did not err
when it held that forms of valuation other than those listed in the partnership agreement could be used to value the husband's interests. 149
The husband also contended in Von Hohn that the trial court had erred
in allowing future earnings to be computed by using "speculative future
income streams" to determine the commercial goodwill of the law
firm. 150 Citing the general proposition that a spouse is entitled only to a
division of property that the community owns at the time of divorce and
not to a percentage of the other spouse's future earnings, the Tyler appellate court reversed the trial court's conclusion that the jury could consider
potential future income in its calculation of the firm's commercial goodwill. 1 51 The husband's law firm was then involved in a series of cases that
were expected to enhance his interest in the law firm by $4,500,000. Not
all of these cases, however, had actually settled at the time of divorce and
thus, the court held that the settled value of these cases alone could be
used to compute the husband's increased interest in the firm.1 52 The settled cases, the court held, could be included despite the fact that the husband had not yet collected his portion of the settlement. The settlement
did not constitute future earnings because payment was contractual and,
therefore, did not require future time or labor of the husband.1 53 The
revenue from the unsettled cases, however, was merely an expectancy interest and was therefore considered to be future earnings that could not
154
be divided on divorce.
On appeal from his divorce decree, in Wells v. Wells 1 55 a former husband asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in making a disproportionate award of marital assets in favor of his former wife. He argued
that in characterizing community property as separate property and in
valuing the marital estate, the court rendered a judgment that was inherently conflicting. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. In Wells
the wife had initiated divorce proceedings and later amended her petition
to include allegations of fault and fraud in the husband's handling of the
community assets. She sought a disproportionate division of the marital
estate after her husband responded by seeking a disproportionate share.
The trial court found that the husband not only threatened his wife with
bodily harm and death, but also defrauded the community. As a consequence, the award of a disproportionate division of the community estate
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 641-42 (citing Smith v. Smith, 836 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1992, no writ) for the proposition that "[a] spouse is not entitled to a percentage of
his or her spouse's future earnings" and that "[a] spouse is only entitled to a division of
property that the community owns at the time of divorce." (emphasis added)).
152. Id. at 642.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 251 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, no pet.).
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for the wife was deemed appropriate. 156
As his final issue, the husband argued that the trial court had erred in
failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of both
parties' case-in-chief. The appellate court overruled this objection on the
basis of its conclusions regarding the husband's other issues.

D.

ESTATE PLANNING SERVICES

In Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. Cailloux,157 a law firm and a bank assisted a
wealthy couple in planning their estates, creating foundations, and making charitable gifts. With written consent the law firm represented both
the couple and the bank. On the husband's death the widowed wife followed the law firm's advice and disclaimed any interest in her deceased
husband's estate. The wife subsequently suffered from Alzheimer's disease, and her son assumed direction of her affairs. The son asserted that
he had uncovered evidence that the bank and the law firm conspired during the family's estate planning process, and he accordingly brought suit
against them. The lower court exercised its equity power in awarding the
son a constructive trust of over sixty-five million dollars.15 8 The appellate
court, however, disagreed and rendered its judgment in favor of the bank
and the law firm. Finding no evidence to support causation, the court
concluded that the son failed to prove that the bank's or the law firm's
breach of fiduciary duty proximately caused any damages to the widowed
wife.1 59 The court also held that the constructive trust was an inappropriate remedy against either the bank or the law firm because neither held
legal title to the claimed assets. 160
E.

REIMBURSEMENT AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION

When spouses expend separate property for the benefit of the community or the community estate expends community property for the benefit
of separate property, the equitable principle of reimbursement provides
compensation for the contributing party. The concept of economic contribution was created by statute in 1999161 as a type of reimbursement but
was not to be guided by equitable principles. Its scope was greatly reduced by 2009 legislation, passed at the behest the Family Law Section of
162
the State Bar of Texas.
156. Id. at 843. Thus, the court held that while the assertion that the husband had physically abused his wife and had threatened to kill her were not findings of fact, they nevertheless supported the inference that the trial court had a rational basis for concluding that
a disproportionate division of the marital estate was warranted.
157. 224 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
158. Id. at 733.
159. Id. at 734-36.
160. Id. at 737.
161. Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 692, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 692,
amended by Act of June 14, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 838, § 3, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 838.
162. Act of June 19, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 768, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. (Vernon)
(to be codified at scattered sections of TEx. FAM. CODE.
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As a practical matter, both equitable reimbursement and economic
contribution require a determination of the amount owed by the benefitted estate. The calculation of this amount differs according to the nature
of the claim.
1.

Reimbursement

If no claim for economic contribution is made, ordinary reimbursement
principles apply. This point was illustrated by In re Rieves.163 There, the
wife sought reimbursement for the use of her separate funds to refurbish
a home owned separately by her former husband. 164 On appeal, the former husband asserted that the trial court erred by not applying the economic contribution formula to his former wife's reimbursement claim.' 65
The court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that "[e]veryone
agreed and argued that [the former wife] was making a claim for reimbursement, not economic contribution.' 66 Even if economic contribution standards could be applied under the facts in Rieves, the court of
appeals determined that the trial court did not err by refusing to follow a
167
statute that was neither pled nor addressed by the court.
2.

Economic Contribution

The principle of economic contribution does not apply to claims for the
dollar amount of expenditures for ordinary maintenance and repair,
taxes, interest, insurance, or the contribution by a spouse of time, toil, or
effort during marriage. 168 The implication is that all claims not identified
by the economic contribution statute are subject to the rules of ordinary
equitable reimbursement. Section 3.408 of the Family Code clarifies this
implication: "[a] claim for economic contribution does not abrogate another claim for reimbursement in a factual circumstance" not described in
the statute. 169 But any conflict between a claim for economic contribution and a claim for reimbursement should be resolved in favor of the
170
claim for economic contribution.
a.

Constitutionality of Economic Contribution Claims

Most of the litigation related to economic contribution relates to application of the statutory formula determining the proper amount of recovery. Additionally, some judges and practitioners question the
constitutionality of the economic contribution statute in that the applica163. No. 10-06-00280-CV, 2007 WL 2447239, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco Aug. 29, 2007, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(b) (Vernon 2006).

169. § 3.408(a).
170. Id.
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tion of the formula may result in a change of character of particular
property.
b.

Recovery for Economic Contribution

In Mays v. Mays 17 1 a former husband challenged the trial court's division of the marital estate, which included ordinary reimbursement and
economic contribution to his former wife. The Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The husband had purchased a home prior to marriage with $3,250 and a loan for the rest of the
purchase price. 172 In 1995 the couple paid the remaining debt of $63,000
using the proceeds from a civil lawsuit. 1 73 Of that sum seventy-one percent was for the wife's emotional distress, which the court noted as constituting her separate property.1 74 The wife testified that she had invested
another $10,000 of her separate inherited property to make improvements upon the house. 175 The trial court found that the house was the
separate property of the husband and ordered the husband to reimburse
the wife for the $10,000 she had spent on improvements in addition to
176
$55,000 for economic contribution secured by an equitable lien.
On appeal the husband argued that the trial court erred by not admitting an inventory into evidence to show the assets and liabilities of each
party. The court rejected his argument, noting that the husband had
failed to comply with the local rules by not filing an inventory and, as a
result, found that he should be precluded from complaining. 177 The court
also noted that it was presumed that the funds used to pay the mortgage
78
were community property.
With respect to the trial court's award to the wife of $55,000 for economic contribution, the husband argued that the wife did not provide sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the funds used to pay
the mortgage were community property. 179 In dividing the property the
trial court heard evidence concerning the civil suit from which the wife
received a separate award used to discharge the debt. The wife had deposited the check for the award into a checking account and immediately
wrote the check to pay the balance of the debt on the house. The wife
also testified that she was unable to obtain documents from her husband
relating to the purchase and discharge of indebtedness on the house.1 80
171. No. 13-05-558-CV, 2007 WL 776684 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Mar. 15, 2007,
pet. denied).
172. Id. at *1.
173. Id. at *4.
174. Id. (citing Licata v. Licata, 11 S.W.3d 269, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, pet. denied)).
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *3.
178. Id. (citing Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Tex. 1982); Saldana v. Saldana,
791 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)).
179. Id. at *3-4.

180. Id. at *4.
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's division and the wife's
$10,000 reimbursement with a lien against the house to secure the
claim. 181 III.

MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF
MARTIAL PROPERTY
A.

STANDING TO INTERVENE

Disputes concerning interspousal liability of marital property turn on
the community or separate nature of marital property. 182 But one spouse
does not act as the agent of the other merely "because of the marriage
relationship."'1 8 3 In Madison v. Williamson,184 the question of spousal
agency arose in the context of a suit for negligent failure to prevent sexual assault. The suit was brought on behalf of a minor child, alleging that
the child's mother failed to prevent the child's father from engaging in
illicit conduct. The court concluded that the marriage relationship did
not create a duty to prevent the assault: "[niothing inherent in this husband-wife relationship gives rise to a fact issue that either spouse had the
right to control the other."1 85 Therefore, the plaintiff was unable to show
186
that the child's mother had a duty to prevent the assault.
Wells v. Dotson 187 was a suit for an alleged breach of contract between
a lessor and the lessee. The Tyler Court of Appeals found that the lesee's
wife lacked standing to intervene. The wife was not a party to the leasecontract, though she had a presumptive community property interest in
her husband's solely-managed community property interest. 88 But if the
option was enforceable, only the husband could enforce it.189
B.

LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN BANKRUPTCY

In In re Wendt, a former husband failed in his attempt to substitute
dischargeable for nondischargeable debt when he declared Chapter 7
bankruptcy. 190 The husband, a veterinarian, retained his veterinary practice after his divorce, but owed the equivalent of "alimony" to his former
wife as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Code. 191 After suffering a
stroke, the veterinarian could not perform surgery and looked for a substitute source of income. He made an arrangement with a seller of
181. Id. at *4-5.
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.201-3.202 (Vernon 2006).
183. Id. at § 3.201.
184. 241 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

185. Id. at 154.

186. Id.

187. 261 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.).
188. Id. at 285.
189. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (Vernon 2006); Blackman v. Bd. of Adjustment,
No. 05-98-00953-CV, 2000 WL 1239981, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (not
designated for publication).
190. In re Wendt, 381 B.R. 217, 223-24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
191. Id. Alimony is a nondischargeable debt under Section 525(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006).
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animal medicines to sell flea and tick medicine, with compensation based
on a deferred billing arrangement. The veterinarian then engaged two
different attorneys, neither of whom had knowledge of the other. He
hired the first attorney to prepare for declaring bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Responding to his former wife's demand
for overdue alimony, the veterinarian hired the second attorney to negotiate a settlement. The latter was successful in negotiating a settlement
for a lump sum payment in return for the release of future alimony obligations, but the veterinarian did not tell his attorneys or his former wife
that he planned to file for bankruptcy. 192 The Chapter 7 bankruptcy on
behalf of the veterinarian and his business was filed the day after he paid
his former wife for releasing his alimony obligation. 193 The trustee of the
business's bankruptcy estate proceeded to recover the lump sum distributed to the former wife as a preference. The former wife thereupon
sought to deny the veterinarian a discharge and to have the "alimony"
194
debt excepted from discharge.
The Bankruptcy Court agreed that the debt should be excepted from
discharge.' 95 The court concluded that remaining silent as to his bankruptcy-planning constituted "a knowing false representation as to current
facts" upon which the former wife relied in granting his release. 196 The
197
court added that the release did not change the character of the debt.
The debt was still "alimony" and could still be excepted under the
Code. 198 The court concluded that the debt should be excepted because
the veterinarian's pursuit of the alimony release, while intending to file
for bankruptcy, created an objective substantial certainty that his actions
would harm his former wife. 199 The court nevertheless found that there
was insufficient evidence that the veterinarian was a fiduciary for his20former wife 200 and that his Chapter 7 petition was deservedly denied. '
In the bankruptcy proceeding20 2 of a homeowner-mortgagor the debtor
and her trustee sought to invalidate the mortgage of her homestead for
20 3
lack of strict compliance with the provisions of the Texas Constitution,
which requires that all information called for in the mortgage-loan documents be supplied in the application. It was asserted that because two of
the pieces of required information were omitted in the loan application,
the lien on the homestead was constitutionally void. The two blanks in
192. Anderson, 318 B.R. at 220. The defendant accumulated the cash necessary to

make a lump sum payment by withholding payment under the deferred billing arrangement applicable to the flea and tick medication. Id. at 221-22.
193. Id. at 221.
194. Id. at 222.
195. Id. at 223-24.
196. Id. at 223.
197. Id. at 224.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 225.
202. Ortegon v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 398 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008).
203. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a).
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the application that had not been filled in were the date of the transaction
and the value of the homestead that was the subject of the mortgage-loan.
The Austin Bankruptcy Court concluded 20 4 that because the homeownerdebtor had not sought correction of the defect within the four-year statute of limitation,2 0 5 the objection to the validity of the mortgage failed.
A loan company that relies on an effective homestead waiver will forfeit the entire principal and interest of a loan. In In re Cadengo a husband, his wife and their two children lived in the husband's separate
house. 20 6 In the divorce, the court ordered the husband and wife to
transfer the house to their minor children, a daughter and a son, when
both were eighteen. 207 The daughter continued residing in the house after she turned eighteen. Before the son had reached his eighteenth birthday the divorced parents found a loan-broker 20 8 who, for a large fee,
arranged a loan. The loan broker and the lender received a copy of the
divorce decree and visited the property while the father and daughter
were present. The loan-closing lasted less than twenty minutes, and,
without any explanation, the broker directed the nineteen year-old
daughter to sign a warranty deed purporting to transfer the property from
the former spouses to their daughter as well as an affidavit (homestead
waiver) that she did not reside on the property and would not claim the
property as her homestead. 20 9 The loan was for $34,000 due and payable
in a year. The proceeds were then distributed: $12,278.83 to discharge the
first mortgage, $1,189.68 to pay for past due property taxes, $6,664.61 to
the former husband, $3,866.88 for closing costs, and $10,000 to the broker
and lender. 210 Several months thereafter the daughter sued to invalidate
the lien.2 11 The bankruptcy court held that (1) the property was her
homestead, (2) the broker and lender could not rely on the homestead
waiver, and (3) the home-equity-loan violated multiple sections of the
Texas Constitution, requiring the lender to forfeit the principal, the interest and to return the pre-suit payments. 212 Relying on the divorce decree, the court also held that the daughter had an equitable title to the
property after reaching eighteen and that her equitable interest and con2 13
tinuous residence in the property established her homestead claim.
The broker and lender were not able to refute the homestead claim,
nor were they able to rely on the homestead waiver signed at the loanclosing. The waiver was ineffective because the broker and lender had a
204. Ortegon, 398 B.R. at 440.
205. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 2008). See Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 834, 839-40 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
206. In re Cadengo, 370 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
207. Id. at 686.
208. Id. The court mentions that three of the last four loans this broker made to the
lender resulted in litigation and that all the witnesses, including the lender, described him
"as being a small step above a loan shark." Id. at 686, 689.
209. Id. at 687.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 685.
212. Id. at 699.
213. Id. at 694.
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copy of the divorce decree showing the daughter's interest, and they had
also acted as witnesses to the daughter's presence while inspecting the
property. 21 4 The court relied on the constitutional language that a lender
may rely upon a homestead waiver only "if it is without knowledge of the
borrower's right to claim a homestead and the borrower is not in actual
use and possession of the homestead property. ' 215 Finally, the court
characterized this transaction as a home equity loan, which violates the
institutional provisions embodied in section 50(a)(6)(C),(E),(M),(Q)
(viii), and 50(g). 216 The court consequently ordered the forfeiture of the
entire principal and interest of the loan, including the pre-suit payments
made by the borrower.
C.

1.

EXEMPT PROPERTY

Homesteads

In Smith v. Hennington, the Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed a
judgment against an ex-husband who had appealed a trial court's judgment resolving a title dispute to real property. 2 17 To satisfy a judgment
against the ex-husband, the plaintiffs levied on and sold forty acres of the
defendant's land, leaving the defendant in possession of ten acres as his
urban homestead. The defendant then asserted that the land in dispute
was rural and not urban and that he was, therefore, entitled to a homestead exemption of 100 acres, part of which was included in the property
sold at the execution sale. The court concluded, however, that the land
of urban realty provided in
seized was indeed urban in that it met the 2test
18
(b).
and
41.002(a)
section
Code
Property
In Wilcox v. Marriott,2 19 the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered
the effect of the 1999 amendments to the homestead provisions of the
Texas Constitution 2 20 and the Property Code. 22 1 There, a residential
homestead had not been protected in full until after the constitutional
amendments expanded the maximum size of an exempt urban homestead
to ten acres. 222 The plaintiff creditor abstracted his judgment in August,
1999.223 The .99 acre homestead at issue was sold in January, 2000 and
a
the defendant-seller netted approximately $250,000. Two months later
224
It
writ of execution was issued covering any real estate owned by him.
was during the time period between judgment and execution that the con214. Id. at 696.
215.

Id.

216. Id. at 696-98.
217. Smith v. Hennington, 249 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet.
denied).
218. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a)-(c) (Vernon 2008).
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Wilcox v. Marriott, 230 S.W.3d 266, 268 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. denied).
TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 51.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 2008).
Wilcox, 230 S.W.3d at 269.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
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stitutional definition of urban homestead was expanded 22 5 and was reflected in the Property Code to cover writs of execution from January 1,
2000.226 A lien on real property acquired before January 1, 2000 was governed by the law in effect on the date the lien was acquired. 2 27 When he
acquired his judgment, the judgment creditor in Wilcox was entitled to
execute on non-exempt property only as defined by the law prior to the
amendments. On the date of execution the size of the exempt homestead
extended the entire parcel from January 1, 2000.228 Thus, the creditor
was barred from enforcing his judgment on it.
Although as a general rule property designated as a homestead is exempt from seizure by creditors, certain types of loans are excluded from
that protection. In Baum v. First Coleman National Bank, the homestead
was not protected from foreclosure because the bank's deed of trust secured a purchase money lien and a mechanic's lien, as purchase money
and home improvement indebtedness fall outside the homestead
229
protection.
2.

Liens on Homesteads

In In re Henderson, the debtors failed to comply with the statutory requirement that bankruptcy petitioners obtain credit-counseling prior to
filing for bankruptcy 23 0-a process that can be very helpful to debtors in
understanding the status of their homes subject to liens. Instead, they
completed credit-counseling immediately after filing. 231 The court found
an applicable exemption to such a failure, that section 109(h)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code was ambiguously worded, and that the debtors substantially, if not literally, fell within the parameters of the exemption. 232 Regardless of their strict compliance with the exemption, the court
determined that compliance with section 109(h)(3) was a waivable standard, especially given exigent circumstances. 233 Finding no reason to
doubt the good faith efforts of the debtors at compliance and that injustice would occur otherwise, the court granted the debtors an extension of
time for complying with the counseling requirement.
The trustee in bankruptcy in In re Palmer2 34 sought to invalidate a
homestead claim of sixty four acres of rural land that the debtor had inherited prior to marriage. 235 The debtor and his wife, however, resided
on his wife's thirteen separate acres located three miles from the debtor's
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
CONST.
230.
231.

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Baum v. First Coleman Nat'l Bank, 227 F. App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2007); see TEX.
art. XVI, § 50(a).
In re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
Id.

Id. at 911.
Id. at 912.
391 B.R. 386 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008).
Id. at 388.
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tract. 23 6 The debtor testified that he had never lived on the sixty-four
acres nor had he used the property to support himself or his family, but
he and his wife intended to use the property for his family support in the
237
future.
The court noted that though a homestead may be owned by the community or may be the separate property of either spouse, 238 a husband
and wife cannot enjoy different homesteads. 239 The court also referred to
the Texas Constitution and Property Code, as amended in 1999, which
provide that a rural homestead of a married claimant can consist of no
'240
more than two hundred acres "which may be in one or more parcels.
Though under the 1999 amendment the urban homestead property must
be contiguous, that requirement is not applicable to the rural homestead.
The court concluded in Palmer,in reliance on In re Murray,241 that to give
homestead protection to the non-contiguous rural acreage, that area must
"somehow support the home," 242 and thus, the debtor must show that the
further tract amounts to a non-contiguous extension of the tract where
the debtor resides. Though the debtor and his wife testified to their plans
businesses, no steps
to use the tract in their ranching and dog-breeding
243
towards these intended uses had been taken.
In Pierce v. Washington Mutual Bank, a homeowner sued the purchaser
of his alleged homestead at a sheriff's sale.2 44 The trial court granted the

defendant-bank's motion for summary judgment. The Tyler Court of Apof
peals reversed and remanded. The defendant had filed an abstract 245
judgment, which clouded the homeowner's title to his home in Canton.
The plaintiff then filed suit against the bank to remove the cloud, insisting
that the property was entitled to homestead protection. 246 The bank responded that based on the homeowner's own interrogatories, the homeowner's homestead property was in Rockwall and was claimed by the
plaintiff as his homestead at the time the bank filed its abstract of judgment. 24 7 The trial court sustained the bank's motion for summary judg236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 389 (citing Behrens v. Behrens, 186 S.W.2d 697, 701-02 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1945, no writ); Wicker v. Rowntree, 185 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.)).
239. Palmer,391 B.R. at 389 (citing Crowder v. Union Nat. Bank of Houston, 261 S.W.
375, 377 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924); In re Mitchell, 80 B.R. 372, 383 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1987)). This observation is accurate under ordinary circumstances, but separated spouses
may have individual homesteads.
240. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b)
(Vernon 2008)).
241. 260 B.R. 815, 830 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
242. Palmer, 391 B.R. at 392 (quoting PaineWebber, Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815, 830
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001)).
243. Id. at 391.
244. Pierce v. Washington Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, pet.
denied).
245. Id. at 712.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 713.
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ment, despite an affidavit filed by the plaintiff in response to the motion
248
which contradicted the interrogatories.
The court of appeals began by noting the importance of the homestead
institution, the broad purpose of which is to protect families from "dependence and pauperism" and "to promote the stability and welfare of
the state. '249 The court went on to cite authority establishing that a person may not claim two homesteads at the same time.25 0 The court also
cited authority establishing that the abandonment of one homestead in
favor of another cannot succeed by merely changing residences and that
proof of abandonment with no intent to return must be "undeniably
25 1
clear."
The court found that the homeowner's affidavit was sufficient to controvert his interrogatory answers and to raise a genuine issue of material
fact, and, as a result, the summary judgment was inappropriate.2 5 2 The
Texas Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it is a "well-established
rule that a deposition does not have controlling effect over an affidavit"
in considering a motion for summary judgment.2 5 3 Thus, the court overruled the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to
determine whether or not the homeowner had abandoned his Canton
254
property as his home in favor of his Rockwall property.
3.

Insurance Code Exemptions

In In re Soza, one day before filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy the debtors
purchased a large annuity. 255 The debtors claimed that the annuity was
exempt under section 1108.051 of the Texas Insurance Code. 256 The trustee asserted that the purchase was a constructive fraud on creditors under
section 1108.053.257 The debtors' defense was that the purchase had been
made to protect their interest in an inheritance of their siblings. The
bankruptcy court found fraud in the debtors' acts and denied the claimed
exemption. The district court reversed this conclusion and allowed the
exemption. The Fifth Circuit court put aside the dispute and concluded
that in passing the Insurance Code, the Texas Legislature "clearly knew"
248. Id.
249. Id. at 714 (citing Estate of Johnson v. Comm'r, 718 F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1983)
(for "dependence and pauperism"), and Andrews v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 121
Tex. 409, 417, 50 S.W.2d 253, 256 (1932) (for promotion of state welfare)).
250. Id. at 715 (citing Silvers v. Welch, 127 Tex. 58, 62, 91 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1936)); see

also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50).
251. Pierce,226 S.W.3d at 715 (citing Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, 149 S.W.3d 796,
808 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet denied); Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 142 Tex. 63, 69, 175

S.W.2d 960, 963 (1943) (for the proposition that changing residences is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment); Burkhardt v. Lieberman, 138 Tex. 409, 416, 159 S.W.2d 847, 852
(1942) (for the proposition that proof of abandonment must be "undeniably clear.")).
252. Id. at 717.
253. Id. at 716 (citing Randall v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 752 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex.
1988)).
254. Id.
255. In re Soza, 542 F.3d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 2008).
256. Id.; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1108.051 (Vernon 2009).
257. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1108.053.
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the difference between fraud committed with or without an intent to defraud. 258 Thus, omission of that distinction from the Insurance Code indicated that fraud might be found without an intent to defraud within the
meaning of "constructive fraud" in section 1108.053,259 which brought the
debtors' purchase of the annuity within the ambit of constructive
fraud. 260 The court recognized that the purpose behind the legislative
enactment of statutory shielding of annuities from creditors was to allow
debtors to provide for their families in the future. In this case, however,
the purpose of the debtors' purchase was to prevent a bankruptcy court
off
from reaching an inheritance, and, as such, it was "a sham to stave
261
litigation" and not in keeping with the purpose of the exemption.
4. Individual Retirement Accounts
An individual retirement account (IRA) may not be claimed as exempt
from a bankruptcy estate if the IRA is inherited from a non-spouse. In In
re Jarboe, a man inherited an IRA from his mother, which he left untouched. 262 Subsequently, the man filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code and claimed that section 42.001 of the Texas
Property Code exempted this IRA from his bankruptcy estate. 26 3 The
bankruptcy court disagreed with the bankrupt because the inherited IRA
did not qualify as such under the Internal Revenue Code.26 4 In consider-

ing this issue of first impression, the bankruptcy court relied on case law
from other jurisdictions. 2 65 The court found a trend to deny exempting
inherited IRAs and that other bankruptcy courts based the decisions not
on similar state property codes, but on the incompatibility of an inherited
IRA with an IRA under the Internal Revenue Code. 266 Joining the

trend, the bankruptcy court held that the inherited IRA was not a sort of
retirement plan. 267 An inherited IRA differed from an ordinary IRA be-

cause: (1) the beneficiary could withdraw from the inherited IRA without
penalty, (2) the beneficiary must take certain withdrawals after one year
the beneficiary could not
or the entire amount within five years, and (3)
2 68
roll-over or contribute to the inherited IRA.

258. Soza, 542 F.3d at 1066.
259. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.

§ 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 2009).
Soza, 542 F.3d. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1068.
In re Jarboe, 365 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
Id. at 718.
The relevant portion of this section protects IRAs from the bankruptcy estate unaccounts do not qualify under the applicable Internal Revenue Code provisions.
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021(a) (Vernon 2000 & supp. 2008).
265. Jarboe, 365 B.R. at 723-24.
266. Id. at 724.
267. Id. at 725.
268. Id.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
less the
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DIVISION ON DIVORCE
DIVISION PROCEEDINGS

In its Opinion No. 584,269 the Professional Ethics Committee for the
State Bar of Texas was asked whether it is permissible under the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to continue to
represent a client in a proceeding after the lawyer has learned that the
conduct of the lawyer's former client may be material to the proceeding.
In Opinion No. 584, a client hired a lawyer to represent the client in a
child-custody modification proceeding against the client's former
spouse. 270 After being hired, the lawyer learned from another source
that his former client in a divorce proceeding had a relationship with his
present client. When contacted by his present client, the lawyer had no
continuing obligations or responsibilities to his former client other than
271
those arising from his former client's status as such.
The Ethics Committee classified this problem as one falling within the
ambit of Rule 1.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, under which a lawyer who has previously represented a particular
client may not thereafter represent another person in a matter adverse to
the former client:
if (a) the new matter questions the validity of the lawyer's services or
work product for the former client, (b) the representation of the subsequent client will in reasonable probability involve a violation of
Rule 1.05, or (c) the matter in which the lawyer represent 272
the subsequent client is the same or a substantially related matter.
The Committee noted that whether a matter falls under the prohibitions
of Rule 1.09 depends on "the likelihood and degree to which the current
representation may result in legal, financial, or other identifiable harm"
273
to the former client.
In this instance, the Committee concluded that the custody proceeding
between the present client and the client's former spouse did not involve
the validity of the lawyer's work for his prior client and that it was not the
same or substantially similar to the matter for which the previous client
had sought the lawyer's services. 274 The Committee also pointed out that
the lawyer's obligation under Rule 1.09(a)(2) (pertaining to potential
269. 71 Tex. B.J. 840 (Nov. 2008).

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.09(a). The Committee also cited In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 51 (Tex. 1998) for the proposition

that matters are "substantially related" under Rule 1.09 "when a genuine threat exists that
a lawyer may divulge in one matter confidential information obtained in the other because
the facts and issues involved in both are so similar." The Committee also noted that in
instances when a substantial relationship exists, Texas courts apply a "conclusive presumption" that confidential information was actually transmitted from client to lawyer. See
Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall,887 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. 1994)).

273. Opinion No. 584, 71 Tex. B.J. at 840.
274. Id.
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Rule 1.05 violations) was discharged if it was not reasonably probable
that the lawyer, in representing his client, would reveal confidential information of the former client or use such information to the client's disadvantage, unless the former client consented after consultation or the
information had become generally known. 275 Thus, a lawyer is free under
Rule 1.09 to represent his client in a proceeding after learning that the
conduct of his former client might be material if the matter is not adverse
to the former client, the matter is adverse to the former client but the
lawyer's work for the former client is not questioned, the present representation does not involve the same or substantially related matter to a
former clients" matter and "the representation will not in reasonable
probability involve a violation of Rule 1.05 with respect to confidential
'276
information of the former client."
Compliance with the provisions of Rule 1.05 was, in the Committee's
estimation, of paramount importance, and the lawyer's representation of
his present client would be improper, notwithstanding Rule 1.09, if by
proceeding, the lawyer failed to abide by the confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.05.277
In In re Ashton, in the course of a trial for divorce, the husband filed a
writ of mandamus requesting relief of his duties of trusteeship and appointment of a new trustee.2 78 The trial court had already appointed a
third party to serve as fee master and successor trustee to the trust which
was created and managed by the husband, and had ordered the trust,
through the new trustee, to pay part of the wife's expenses of the trial and
her attorney's fees. 27 9 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction over the trust. In the divorce proceeding the
husband had been amended as a party in his individual capacity only and
not in his capacity as trustee; therefore, the trust had not otherwise been
named as a party. 280 The trial court's order, with respect to the husband's
trusteeship, was therefore void. The court noted that jurisdiction over a
party to a suit is contingent on the proper service of process on that party
and that suits against a trust must be brought against its legal representative who is named and acting as such.28 1 The court of appeals conditionally granted the husband's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed
275. Id. at 841. The Committee cited Comment 4 of Rule 1.09 for this proposition,
which declares that "if there were a reasonable probability that the subsequent representation would involve either an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information under
Rule 1.05(b)(1) or an improper use of such information to the disadvantage of the former
client under Rule 1.05(b)(3), that representation would be improper under paragraph (a)."
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. T.2, Subt. G App. A, Art. 10, § 9, Rule 1.09 (Vernon 2009).
276. Opinion No. 584, 71 Tex. B.J. at 841.

277. Id.
278. 266 S.W.3d 602, 603 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
279. Id. The wife had asserted that she would be unable to compensate her attorneys
and experts because her husband had siphoned community funds into the trust and thereby
limited her access to them. She asked the trial court to equalize the parties' fees, to appoint a fee master, and to appoint a successor trustee to manage the trust. Id.
280. Id. at 604.
281. Id.
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the trial court to vacate the order concerning the trust. The wife's request
and her alternative request
to dismiss the writ of mandamus for mootness
282
to abate the proceeding were denied.
In Boufaissal v. Boufaissal,283the parties tendered an agreed decree of
divorce to the trial judge for signature after a simple prove-up hearing.
The decree recited the terms of their divorce and property division. In
response to the wife's appeal from the judgment to which she had agreed,
the court held that she was barred from taking an appeal in the absence
28 4
of any allegation and proof of fraud, collusion, or misinterpretation.
She did not assert any of those grounds. A party's consent to the trial
judge's entry of judgment waives any error except for those pertaining to
jurisdiction. The wife had already signified her approval and consent to
the terms of the decree as to both form and substance and, therefore,
285
waived her complaint.
B.

MAKING THE DIVISION

In Witte v. Witte,286 the ex-husband challenged the trial court's division
of property. The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals, with
some misgiving by Justice Thompson Frost as to the appellant's waiver of
certain issues by a briefing error, 287 affirmed the lower court's division
citing the insufficient evidence presented by the husband in support of his
assertion. In his appeal, the husband argued that the trial court erred by
mischaracterizing community property as the wife's separate property
and by awarding the wife reimbursement from the community estate. 288
The ex-husband also asserted that the award of certain property to the
ex-wife had a material ill effect on the property division. The court rejected the ex-husband's apparently imprecise argument on the grounds
2 89
that there was no demonstrated support.
The ex-husband also challenged the factual sufficiency of the evidence
offered to rebut the community presumption that led to the trial court's
awarding shares of stock in three closely-held family corporations to his
ex-wife. As to the shares from two of the corporations, the ex-husband
presented no evidence to support his challenge. 290 As to the shares from
the third corporation, the ex-wife had executed a loan of $700,000 to
purchase the shares, and as of the date of the appeal she had repaid only
282. Id. at 605.
283. 251 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).

284. Id. at 161.
285. Id.
286. No. 14-05-00768-CV, 2008 WL 451717 at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, pet. designated) (not designated for publication) ("Because the issues in this case are
not settled, Senior Justice Edelman opposes designation of this opinion as memorandum;
but because he has not written a concurrence or dissent, the decision to designate it as [a]
memorandum is determined by a majority of the panel.").
287. Id. at *3.
288. Id. at *1.
289. Id. at *2.
290. Id.
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$10,000. The divorce decree made no mention of this debt nor assigned it
to either party,2 9 1 but the ex-husband failed to provide sufficient evidence
that would establish the value of the stock had, at any time since its
purchase, appreciated to an amount exceeding the outstanding debt. The
court concluded that even if the stock had been characterized as community property and the debt as a community liability, there was no evidence that the debt and the stock combined would have resulted in any
positive value and, therefore, could not have had a material effect on the
division. 29 2 Thus, the court rejected the ex-husband's argument with re2 93
spect to the shares from all three corporations.
The ex-husband also contended that the trial court erred in considering
his fault as a factor in making an unequal division of the marital estate,
despite the fact that the divorce was granted on no-fault grounds. The
appellate court rejected his argument and noted that while the Texas Supreme Court has not decided this point, the Houston Court of Appeals
294
held that it is appropriate to grant the divorce in such circumstances.
As to issues raised by the ex-husband for the first time on appeal, the
court rejected considerations of those issues, noting that issues not raised
in an appellant's original brief are waived. 295 The court concluded by
affirming the judgment of the trial court.
In Brooks v. Brooks,296 the husband appealed from the trial court's
failure to render judgment in a divorce proceeding in accordance with a
mediated settlement agreement and the trial court's award of ex-spousal
maintenance to the wife. The couple had entered into a mediated settlement agreement dividing their property in accordance with section
6.602297 after the wife had filed for divorce. Over a year later, counsel for
the parties agreed to void the settlement agreement and remediate the
dispute. Before new mediation could occur, however, the parties retried
the case. Each spouse had new plans for property division. Despite the
husband's motion for substitution of counsel, which was granted, and his
new counsel's subsequently filed motion for a new trial, the court denied
the motion and signed the final decree which was more generous to the
wife than the proposed mediated agreement based on the contention that
the mediated settlement agreement should have been the basis of the trial
court's division. On appeal, the court held that the husband was barred
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at *2 (citing Mohindra v. Mohindra, No. 14-06-00056-CV, 2007 WL 3072057, at
*2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); Bishop v. Bishop, No. 14-02-00132-CV, 2003 WL 21229476, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 29, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
295. Witte, 2008 WL 451717, at *3 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 38.3; Yazdchi v Bank One,
Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied), cert
denied, 549 U.S. 895 (2006); Zamarron v. Shinko Wire Co., 125 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).
296. 257 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
297. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602.
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from enforcing the prior agreement under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel
because it would have been unconscionable to allow enforcement after he
had taken the inconsistent position that it was unenforceable, as demon298
strated by his unwillingness to participate in a subsequent mediation.
As to the enforceability of mediated settlement agreements generally, the
court pointed out that while such agreements that meet the requirements
of section 6.602(b) are binding despite a unilateral withdrawal of consent,
a trial court is nevertheless free to disregard such an agreement in certain
circumstances, which in this case included the presence of a colorable
2 99
quasi-estoppel claim.
In Chafino v. Chafino,30 0 the wife appealed a divorce decree contend-

ing that the trial court abused its discretion in its division of community
property. The wife's petition had alleged insupportability, adultery, and
cruel treatment. Her husband denied and counterclaimed alleging insupportability and cruelty. 30 1 The El Paso appellate court observed that the
husband's "apparent adulterous behavior and his consistent denials
thereof provided the trial court with a reasonable basis for making an
unequal property division. '30 2 The wife had been awarded over seventy
percent of the marital assets in that disproportionate division. 30 3 On appeal she asserted that she was entitled to an even greater percentage of
the marital estate because of her husband's alleged infidelity.30 4 The
court of appeals rejected that argument and noted that disproportionate
divisions on divorce are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
and that the trial court had had a reasonable basis to support the particular percentages of property granted to each party. 30 5 Therefore, the wife
failed to discharge her burden to show that the division was clearly an
abuse of discretion. An unequal property division, the court said, may not
be used merely to punish the party at fault in a divorce, and, in the absence of evidence that the award in place was clearly an abuse of the trial
court's discretion, the award would be upheld without enhancement regardless of whether
the reviewing court's might have reached a contrary
30 6
conclusion.
In the wife's suit for divorce in Burney v. Burney,30 7 the ex-husband

challenged the division of property. He raised two issues: (1) the trial
court's handling of debts and (2) its failure to deal with two checks and a
washer and dryer, which he claimed as his separate property. 3 8 The trial
court determined that the debt would be the responsibility of the spouse
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Brooks, 257 S.W.3d at 423-24.
Id. at 421-22.
228 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.

304. Id. at 474.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
225 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.).
Id. at 217-18.
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in whose name the debt was incurred 3 9-a decision based in part on the
fact that the evidence concerning debts was insufficient. The husband
had alleged that the total amount of debt accumulated during the marriage was over $73,000, of which over $48,000 was incurred by his exwife. 310 Thus, he argued that the trial court erred by not ordering the exwife to pay that amount. The El Paso Court of Appeals found the husband's accounting of the debt was inaccurate. The court also considered
the wife's allegations that some portions of the debt resulted from the exhusband's deliberate attempt to block her payments. 311 The appellate
court also noted that the wife's employment was sporadic and that the
husband, as a member of an accounting firm, had "more ability to retire
debts." As a result, the appellate court found that evidence supported
3 12
the trial court's exercise of discretion regarding the debts.
On his second issue, the ex-husband argued that the trial court failed to
account for an insurance check, a travel expense check, and a kitchen
appliance, all of which he claimed as his separate property. The wife testified that the check was issued by the insurance company to cover stolen
lawn furniture, some of which was the separate property of each spouse,
and she further admitted forging her husband's endorsement of the check
and depositing the proceeds into their joint account to pay for living expenses after they were separated. She asserted that the travel-expense
check was used to pay for groceries and day care. The court of appeals
found that the trial court had a reasonable basis for believing the testimony of the ex-wife regarding her use of the funds to discharge the husband's duty of support with no right of reimbursement. 3 13 As to the
husband's separate appliance, which the trial court concluded should remain in the house for the benefit of the couple's only child, the court of
appeals concluded that the husband had been improperly divested of his
separate property. 3 14 The case was remanded to the trial court to redivide the property in accordance with the opinion, but if the ex-wife filed a
315
remittitur of the washing machine, the judgment was affirmed.
With respect to characterization of some of the property at issue, the
wife offered the oral testimony from her mother to establish that her father had given particular property to the wife. The husband responded
by asserting that this evidence was insufficient to rebut the community
316
presumption because no effort to trace the property had been made.
The court nevertheless found that tracing was inapplicable to this case in
the absence of any suggestion of a mutation of the property. The oral
testimony offered by the wife's mother as to the acquisition had estab309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 219-21.
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lished its separate character. 317
In a motion following the trial in the wife's suit for divorce in Love v.
Bailey Love, 318 the wife sought an order requiring the husband to pay
$5,000 that the trial court had awarded to her as attorney's fees pending
appeal. The husband 319 asserted that he could not be ordered to pay because the trial court had considered attorney's fees in making a division
of the community property and the matter was thus res judicata to a subsequent order to pay attorney's fees pending appeal. The husband relied
on the authority of John M. Gillis, P.C. v. Wilbur,320 in which an attorney
representing a wife was unsuccessful in his post-divorce efforts to secure
his attorney's fees from his client. In that instance, the court had concluded that the wife's attorney's fees (as an integral part of the property
division) should have been sought in "the divorce action," and if the
grant of fees is not so ordered by the divorce court as part of the division,
the granting of attorney's fees becomes res judicata.321 In Love, the appellate court regarded the authority of Gillis as inapplicable because section 6.709(a)(2), under which the wife had been awarded the fees by the
trial court, supplies an independent authority for granting such a postdivorce temporary order. 322 The court might have noted that section
6.709 was not enacted until 1997, twelve years after Gillis was decided.
C.

Ex-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

In Chafino v. Chafino,323 the El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that:
(1) a trial court's decision to award ex-spousal maintenance is governed
by an abuse of discretion standard; (2) section 8.051 of the Texas Family
Code places affirmative requirements on a party seeking such maintenance; and (3) because the wife had failed to meet the statutory requirements, the trial court did not abuse its decision. 3 24 The court stressed that
the Family Code presumes that ex-spousal maintenance is not warranted
unless the movant-spouse has attempted to seek post-divorce employment or to develop such practical skills to make self-sufficiency possible.
The wife in this case had not taken such steps. 325 The court of appeals,
therefore, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
317.

Id.

318. 217 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
319. The terms wife and husband are used by the court rather than ex-wife and exhusband though nothing is said about the supercession of the trial court's order.
320. 700 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
321. Id. at 736-37; Love, 217 S.W.3d at 36.
322. Love, 217 S.W.3d at 36 n.2; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.709(a)(2) (Vernon
2006).
323. 228 S.W.3d 467, 474-75 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.).
324. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051(2)(C) (Vernon 2006) (requiring that the marriage
lasted ten years or longer and that "the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property, including property distributed to the spouse under this code, to provide for the
spouse's minimum reasonable needs: and that the spouse "clearly lacks earning ability in
the labor market adequate to provide support for the spouse's minimum reasonable
needs.").

325. Id.
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to award ex-spousal maintenance. 326
In re Green, on the other hand, dealt with enforcement of an ex327
spousal support based on an agreement between the divorcing spouses.
The former wife asserted that her former husband had failed to make the
agreed ex-spousal support payments and to maintain health insurance for
their children as required by the agreed divorce decree. The district court
granted her motion for contempt and ordered the former husband held
until he purged his contempt. The former husband filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he could not be imprisoned for nonpayment of a contractual support obligation incorporated in his divorce
decree. 328 The Texas Supreme Court held that a court's order to pay exspousal support is unenforceable by contempt if the order merely restates
a private debt rather than a legal duty imposed by Texas law. 329 The
Supreme Court relied on Texas's constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt.3 30 The former husband had voluntarily agreed to make
contractual payments and was not ordered to do so under the Family
Code's provision for ex-spousal maintenance. The voluntary support
331
payments in this case clearly fell outside Chapter 8 of the Family Code.
The payment ordered exceeded the three-year extent of court-ordered
ex-spousal maintenance and there was no finding that the former wife
was disabled, caring for a disabled child, or lacked sufficient earning ability. Further, the decree did not state that the payments would terminate
upon the former wife's remarriage. 332 Citing its previous decision in Ex
parte Hall, the court stated that because the support order was not entered "on the authority of the Family Code," it could not be enforced by
333
contempt.
Acknowledging that a failure to provide health insurance under a voluntary agreement can be punished by contempt, the court determined
that the former husband could not be confined in this case due to absence
of a proper commitment order. 334 Whether the court meant that a failure to provide health insurance, standing alone, will serve as a sufficient
basis for a judgment of contempt and resulting commitment is not clear.
The Texas Supreme Court emphasized, however, that a contempt order
335
cannot contain uncertainty or ambiguity of meaning.
On appeal from a clarification and enforcement order of his divorce
decree in Parrish v. Parrish, the former husband challenged the trial
326. Id.
327. In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645, 646 (Tex. 2007).
328. Id. at 646-47.
329. Id. at 647.
330. Id. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18 (stating that "[n]o person shall ever be imprisoned
for debt").
331. In re Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647-48.
332. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.051(2), 8.054, 8.056(a).
333. In re Green, 221 S.W.3d at 648 (quoting ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.
1993)).
334. Id. at 649.
335. Id.
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court's division of stock options as unsupported by sufficient evidence
and asserted that the trial court had erred by not preparing findings of
fact and conclusions of law. 336 In 2003 the parties entered into a mediated agreement prior to their final divorce-hearing for division of most of
their assets. They agreed to make an equal division of stock-options
granted by any employer of the husband, and the final divorce decree
reflected their agreement as to any options existing on December 16,
2003. 337 In 2006, the former wife filed a motion for clarification because
she regarded the decree's general reference to stock-options as not sufficiently specific to be enforceable by contempt. 338 Her ex-husband responded with a petition for enforcement asserting that his former wife
had failed to comply with provisions of the decree. The ex-wife then filed
her petition for enforcement, contending that her former husband had
disposed of stock-options without turning over any after-tax proceeds to
33 9
her.
Although the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and received
testimony concerning other types of property, no testimony was offered
about the stock-options. 340 Four months later a new order was prepared
and the ex-husband's counsel advised the court that the net proceeds
from the stock options were then $123,000, but he failed to offer proof of
this assertion because his client was out of the country. The trial court
nevertheless signed a clarification and enforcement order awarding the
ex-wife one-half of two grants of stock options from 2001 and 2003 with341
out hearing any other evidence.
The Eastland Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not have
sufficient evidence to support an enforcement and clarification order addressing specific grants of stock options for which it had heard no evidence but disagreed with the former husband's assertion that the decree
affected only vested stock-options. 342 The court noted that Texas courts
have a "mandatory duty to order a division of the [marital] estate" on
divorce and that "this duty extends to unvested stock-options because
they constitute a contingent interest in property and are thus a community asset. ' 343 Specifically the court noted that the term "in existence" is
neither synonymous with vested nor inconsistent with contingent and that
"a construction [of the divorce decree] that favors the division of a community asset is generally preferable. ' 344 The court of appeals concluded
by reversing the trial court's clarification and enforcement order in part
345
and remanding the case for further proceedings.
336. 254 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, no pet.).

337. Id. at 573.
338. Id. at 574.

339. Id.
340. Id.

341. Id.
342. Id. at 575.

343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 576.
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D. ENFORCEMENT
After rendition of a divorce in Sheikh v. Sheikh, the trial court awarded
the wife an owelty judgment of $632,000 to equalize the property division
and $330,000 in actual damages against her husband for assault and
fraud. 346 During the pendency of the husband's appeal, the wife filed her
application for a post-judgment turnover order and appointment of a receiver, including a request that the receiver serve as a master in chancery. 347 The husband filed an opposition to the turnover application,
alleging that section 9.007(c) of the Texas Family Code prohibited the
requested relief because he did not hold any non-exempt property except
for that awarded to the wife in the decree and that the order exceeded
the terms of the wife's application by authorizing the receiver to take
action that superseded the authority of the turnover order. 348 The trial
349
court nevertheless granted a turnover order and a receivership order.
On appeal from this order, the appellate court held that the trial court did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce this order because section
9.007(c) explicitly prohibits enforcement of orders designed to assist in
implementing a property division while a valid appeal from such a division is pending. 35 0 The court stated that section 9.007(c) is aimed at orders that go beyond a "ministerial act of execution" to implement a
decree's property division. 351 The court noted, however, that the trial
court would have jurisdiction to enforce the turnover order to the extent
that it merely enforced the monetary award of the divorce decree. 352 In
this instance the order was written so broadly that whatever its permissible application, it nevertheless had the erroneous effect of authorizing the
receiver to take possession and dispose of assets that necessarily included
353
some of the property that was the subject of the contested division.
The appellate court concluded that because the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the unsuperseded monetary judgment against the hus346. 248 S.W.3d 381, 384-85 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
347. Id. at 385.
348. Id. Section 9.007(c) of the Family Code provides that "[t]he power of the court to
render further orders to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the property division is
abated while an appellate proceeding is pending." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(c)
(Vernon 2006) (emphasis added). In English v. English, this process was interpreted as
meaning that "the trial court is prohibited from implementing and clarifying the property
division by way of further order" while an appeal is pending. 44 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
349. Sheikh, 248 S.W.3d at 385. The order granted the receiver authority to take possession of and to sell "all non-exempt property of [husband] that [was] in [his] actual or constructive possession or control." The order seemed to reach only the monetary award
incidental to the divorce decree but alluded to division of property contained in the divorce
decree. Id. at 388-89.
350. Id. at 391-92.
351. Id. at 388 (citing In re Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d 268, 272 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist] 2005, no pet.).
352. Id. at 389-90.
353. Id. at 390. "It is clear from [the wife's] pleadings and the parties' discussions at the
turnover-and-receivership hearings, and from evidence adduced at that hearing, that at
least part of what [the wife] sought by her application was the turnover of property that
had been awarded to her in the divorce decree." Id. at 391.
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band, the trial court had general subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the
turnover order and the receivership order except to the extent that the
later order allowed the receiver to take property still in the husband's
possession as a matter of dispute in the pending appeal. 35 4 The court
further held that it was an abuse of discretion not to limit the receiver's
authority to prevent his implementation of the decree's property division
pending the appeal. 355 The court also held that Texas law dictated that
the appointment of a master in chancery, whenever entered, was unappealable whether or not the appointment was imbedded in an invalid order, and the proper vehicle to challenge the appointment of a master in
chancery is a writ of mandamus. 356 The appellate court reversed all portions of the trial court's order except that part appointing a master in
chancery, a matter the appellate court regarded
as beyond its jurisdiction
7
35
to consider, and remanded the cause.

Mediated divorce settlement agreements are immediately binding, may
survive the death of a party even if the court has not issued a divorce
decree, and may affect beneficiary designations in wills. In Spiegel v.
KLRU Endowment Fund, a husband and wife had signed a mediated settlement agreement, but the wife died before the court could issue a final
divorce decree. 358 Her will, executed before the settlement agreement,
devised "our homestead" to her husband. Her executor filed a declaratory action in the county court to enforce the settlement agreement and
to prevent the husband from receiving assets allocated to the wife in the
settlement agreement but left to him in the will. The county court agreed
with the executor.3 5 9 The appellate court affirmed that decision. 360 In
deciding the issue of first impression, the court held that the mediated
settlement agreement was immediately binding and did not need to be
incorporated in a final divorce decree before a spouse's death to be enforceable. 361 The court noted that section 6.602 "allows spouses to enter
into settlement agreements that are immediately binding and do not require the approval of the court," that public policy supports the immediate effectiveness of mediated settlement agreements and their
354. Id. at 391-92. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(c) (Vernon 2006).
355. Id. at 392.
356. Id. at 393-94. See In re Holt, 01-06-00290-CV, 2006 WL 1549968, at *1-3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 8, 2006, no pet.) (memo op., not designated for publication) (amending mandamus relief from a post-judgment order appointing a master in chancery when a separate, previously entered, post-judgment turnover and receivership order
has been suspended before appointment of the chancery master); Simpson v. Canales, 806
S.W.2d 802, 812 (Tex. 1991) (noting that an order of a pre-trial master in chancery is reviewable by mandamus because "[t]o require the parties to reserve their complaint for
appeal would be to deny them any effective relief from the trial court's order."); see also In
re Moyer, 183 S.W.3d 48, 58-59 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that appellate
jurisdiction does not extend to a post-judgment order appointing a master in chancery even
when that order was embedded a turnover and receivership order).
357. Sheikh, 248 S.W.3d at 395.
358. 228 S.W.3d 237, 239-40 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
359. Id. at 240.
360. Id. at 239.
361. Id. at 241-43.
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enforcement to reduce litigation, and that sale is an incentive to mediate
in order to take advantage of a prompt final resolution, which promotes
good faith mediation. 362 The court also stressed that the settlement agreement contained plain language showing the parties' intention that the
agreement be immediately effective. 363 The court further held that the
homestead referred to in the deceased wife's will became part of her residuary estate because the settlement agreement designated the homestead as the wife's separate property and the husband had established a
new residence. 364 The court went on to hold that the husband had no
interest in any assets that were bequeathed to him but were subsequently
allotted to the wife in the settlement agreement. 365 The court noted a
split among appellate courts regarding the need for specific language revoking beneficiary designations in a settlement agreement or divorce decree. 36 6 The court concluded that the settlement agreement, in lieu of
specific language, contained releases against future claims and achieved
the complete severance of the parties' financial relationship. 3 67
Dempsey v. Dempsey was before the El Paso Court of Appeals on a
motion for rehearing of the former wife's petition for a protective order
in response to the ex-husband's acts of family violence. 368 The former
husband appealed the protective order that had been given in 2004 in
favor of his former wife. After the associate judge had found that family
violence had occurred and was likely to occur again, the district judge
approved the associate judge's recommendation that a protective order
be granted. The former husband contended that the trial court, in denying his motion for a continuance, had erred in accepting the ex-wife's
version of the facts.
The court noted that when a respondent to an application for a protective order is served with notice of an application within forty-eight hours
before the time set for a scheduled hearing requested by the petitioner,
the trial court must, upon request, reschedule the hearing for a date not
later than fourteen days after the date set for the hearing. 369 The appellant admitted that he was served with notice on June 11, for a hearing
scheduled on June 17, more than forty-eight hours before the hearing was
set. 370 The court concluded that, under the circumstances and because of
the expedited nature of the proceedings, it could not conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion. 371 Nor did the court find that the trial
court had acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in denying the former hus362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 241; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon 2006).
Spiegel, 228 S.W.3d at 242.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245.
227 S.W.3d 771, 773 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.).
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
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band's motion for a continuance. 372
The former husband also complained that the trial court abused its discretion in its finding that family violence had occurred and was likely to
occur again based solely on the former wife's testimony. In conducting its
abuse of discretion review of the trial court's finding and the trial court's
order, the appellate court raised two questions: (1) did the trial court
have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and (2)
did the trial court err in its application of good judgment? 373 In considering the legal sufficiency point, the appellate court explained that it considers the evidence that tends to support the findings of fact and disregards
contradictory evidence and inferences. Viewing the evidence in favor of
the trial court's findings, the appellate court concluded that the former
wife's testimony provided more than a scintilla of evidence to support the
finding of family violence and that the finding was not so against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly
unjust. 3 7 4 The former husband had argued that the trial court should
have discredited all of the former wife's testimony, but the appellate
court noted that the trial court was the sole judge of a witness's credibility
'375
and was "free to reject or accept all or part of a witness's testimony.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion because it was entitled to believe the former wife's version of events as to some of her allegations but
not all of them. 376 The former husband further argued that one of his
former wife's allegations was a "global allegation of an act of violence,"
and that such a global allegation presents "a guessing game for a respondent. ' 377 The El Paso court's response was that the Family Code does
not require an applicant for a protective order to provide specific facts of
alleged violence. 378 As to the alleged acts of family violence toward his
wife, the husband argued that she had voluntarily placed herself in a dangerous situation and that the perceived threat was not directed against
her. 379 The court found, however, that the former husband's act of pushing his former wife constituted an act of family violence in accordance
with the definition found in the Family Code, regardless of the surroundbased
ing circumstances. 380 The court found no exception in the statute 381
upon a victim's being at fault for having placed herself in danger.
In affirming the trial court's order, the El Paso court concluded that the
trial court had, as a matter of law and fact, sufficient information upon
which to exercise its discretion and that the trial court's decision to grant
the protective order against the former husband was reasonable and not
372. Id.
373. Id. at 777.

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 778 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.004 (Vernon 2006)).
Id.
Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 2006)).
Id.
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arbitrary. 382
In Chek Investments, L.L.C. v. L.R., 383 the wife sued her husband for
divorce and amended her pleadings to join the appealing business entities
of her husband as defendants. Those three appellants were operated primarily outside Texas, as alleged agents of her husband acting as repositories for misappropriated community funds and debts. 384 The appellants
joined in a single special appearance challenging the court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them, and the trial court denied the special appearance in its entirety. 385 In this interlocutory appeal, the wife moved
for dismissal for want of jurisdiction. The Dallas Court of Appeals held
that it could only exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from
an order denying a special appearance if the underlying suit did not arise
from a cause of action brought under the Family Code.386 In interpreting
Section 51.014, the Dallas Court of Appeals recognized that the text of
the statute indicated two competing legislative purposes-to encourage
prompt appellate review of special-appearance rulings and to recognize
that "the burdens of expense and delay caused by interlocutory appeals
are less tolerable in family-law disputes, and [therefore] the need for
prompt resolution in such cases outweighs the benefits to be had from
allowing interlocutory appellate review. ' 387 The court continued by noting that the word "suit" is defined as "any proceeding in a court of justice
by which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of justice which the
law affords him," and that the word "under" in this context generally
means "by authority of."' 388 Thus, the court held that the wife's underlying divorce proceeding in which the appellants had been joined clearly
constituted a "suit" arising "under" the Family Code, and, therefore, the
appellants were attempting to bring an interlocutory appeal in a context
that 'Was specifically forbidden by statute. 389 The court concluded by noting that this section does not limit itself to defendants who are "sued
under" the Family Code but rather applies if the defendants "specially
appear[ ] 'in a suit brought under the Family Code.'1, 390 The court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the appellant's interlocutory appeal. 391
In Tracy v. Tracy, the former wife appealed the trial court's order finding her in contempt for violating the divorce decree. 392 Because it did not
have jurisdiction over a judgment for contempt by direct appeal, the Dal382. Id. at 778-79.
383. 260 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).

384. Id. at 705.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 706; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 2008).
387. Check Invs., 260 S.W.3d at 706.
388. Id. The definition of "suit" was extracted from Nat'l Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315,
167 S.W.2d 1021, 1023 (1943), and that of "under" from Powell v. City of Baird, 133 Tex.
489, 128 S.W.2d 786, 790 (1939).
389. Id. at 707.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. 219 S.W.3d 527, 528 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
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las Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 39 3
Due to the unusual facts presented in this proceeding, however, the court
nevertheless provided guidance to the trial judge on the validity of the
contempt order under which the former wife risked confinement.
As part of the divorce decree, the former husband had been ordered to
apply for refinancing of the marital residence and to pay the former wife
$50,000 upon closing of the refinancing.3 94 The former wife was, in turn,
ordered to tender a special warranty deed to the closing agent for the
refinancing. The former husband brought a petition to enforce the decree, complaining that his former wife had refused to deliver the deed
after he had paid her $50,000 and that she had demanded that he pay her
an additional $10,000 before she would tender the deed. The former husband argued that his ex-wife be held in contempt, jailed, and fined for her
395
violations of the court's order and sought reasonable attorney's fees.
Two days after the petition was filed, the former wife executed and delivered the deed to the former husband. At the enforcement hearing, the
ex-husband's counsel acknowledged receipt of the deed, but the ex-husband argued that he was entitled to attorney's fees that could have been
avoided had his former wife complied promptly with the terms and conditions of the decree. The trial court found the former wife in contempt of
court for having violated the divorce decree and awarded the former husband attorney's fees and costs. 396 But the former wife did not pay the
attorney's fees and instead filed a motion to vacate or amend the order.
She contended that the award of attorney's fees could not be enforced by
contempt. She also asserted that there was newly discovered evidence
that she may have executed a special warranty deed and returned it to the
lender in a timely manner. 397 The former wife's counsel explained that
his client had actually executed the deed before the petition for enforcement was filed but that, as counsel, he had not been aware of the document at the previous hearing because he did not prepare the document
and did not he have a copy of it in his file. He also explained that the
former wife did not realize she had signed the deed and only found a
copy of the last page after the last hearing. 398 The trial judge ultimately
the imposidenied the motion to vacate the order but agreed to suspend 399
tion of his subsequent order until the appeal was completed.

On appeal, the former wife first argued that the trial judge abused his
discretion in holding her in contempt because the decree was not specific
enough to be enforced by contempt and that she had fully complied with
the portion of the decree in question by the time the petition was
presented to the court. She also argued that the portion of the order by
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 528-29.
at 529.
at 529-30.
at 530.
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which she was confined for nonpayment of attorney's fees constituted a
prohibited imprisonment for debt and was, therefore, void as a matter of
law. The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that the record made it
clear that under the order of contempt, the former wife could only avoid
confinement by paying the attorney's fees of opposing counsel. 40 0 The
court noted, however, that a trial court shall not imprison a person for
debt, and that our law does not allow collection of attorney's fees by contempt proceedings. 40 1 Because the order in this case purported to do
what the law does not allow, it was void. In offering its guidance with
respect to the order, the court noted its assumption that the trial judge
would not attempt to enforce the void order or direct confinement for its
breach. In dismissing the appeal, the Dallas appellate court held that it
had no jurisdiction over the direct appeal from the contempt order but
held that the contempt order was void because it improperly40 threatened
2
to confine the former wife for failing to pay attorney's fees.
In DeGroot v. DeGroot, the wife's petition for divorce was granted in
July, 2006 and incorporated a prior mediation agreement. 40 3 At the request of the parties, the court appointed an arbitrator and subsequently
40 4
issued a new divorce decree. The wife appealed from the new decree.
The court of appeals held that the later divorce decree was invalid because the trial court's plenary power had expired when it sought to do
more than clarify the original divorce decree. The ex-husband asserted
that he had mailed the trial court his motion to clarify the decree on August 18, 2006, although it was not filed until August 23. In October, 2006
the parties filed a joint motion for appointment of an arbitrator with the
hope of resolving several post-divorce disputes. An arbitrator was appointed in mid-October for the purpose of resolving any unsettled issues
regarding the July decree. The order noted that the result of the arbitration was to be binding, but on appeal the parties asserted that it was
never intended to be so. The trial court administratively closed the case
pending arbitration but retained jurisdiction if causes were shown that
further litigation would be necessary. On November 1, 2006 the ex-wife
filed a petition for enforcement of the original decree. When the arbitration concluded on December 18, 2006, the arbitrator signed an arbitration
order that changed both the property division and the terms of the original divorce decree and stated that the parties had "arbitrated the remaining issues for the preparation of the Final Decree of Divorce. '40 5 In
January, 2007 the ex-husband filed motions to set aside the original decree, to confirm the arbitration order, and to issue a new decree incorporating its results. 40 6 The ex-wife subsequently filed pro se motions for a
400. Id. at 531.
401. Id.
402. Id.

403. 260 S.W.3d 658, 660 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
404. Id.

405. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
406. Id.
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QDRO and for review of the arbitrator's order. The trial court then
orally denied those motions and a petition for enforcement without vacating its order administratively closing the case. A new divorce decree
was entered on January 24, 2007. The ex-wife filed a motion for a new
trial, which was denied without a hearing on February 21, 2007, and she
filed her notice of appeal on March 9, 2007. On the same day, the court
signed written orders denying the ex-wife's motion for review of the arbitration order, her motion for a QDRO, and her petition for enforcement. 40 7 On appeal, the ex-wife first argued that the trial court erred
when it signed the January divorce decree to replace the July decree because the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired. 40 8 She also asserted that the January decree substantially revised the property division,
thus exceeding the trial court's power to clarify its original decree. 40 9 The
ex-husband argued that his motion for clarification, which was filestamped on August 23, 2006, was actually mailed on August 18, the last
day to file a motion to modify and that the "mailbox rule" made the filing
timely. 4 10 He also argued that his motion for clarification included a substantial change to the original divorce decree and should therefore be
interpreted as a motion to modify, thus extending the trial court's plenary
power under Rule 329b(a), (g). 411 He further argued that the trial court's
order appointing an arbitrator not only vacated the original divorce decree, but also may have granted
a new trial because it was based on his
"motion for clarification. ' 412 He relied on the trial court's "administrative close order" in which it purported to retain "complete jurisdiction"
4 13
to support this conclusion.

The court of appeals disagreed. The "substantive" changes to which
the ex-husband alluded in his "motion for clarification" were not substantive enough to qualify as a motion for modification, and, thus, in the
court's view, the trial court's plenary jurisdiction to modify or set aside
the first divorce decree expired on August 18, 2006-thirty days after that
decree was entered. 414 The court went on to hold that because the first
decree had been entered in July, 2006 the subsequent decree modified the
terms of the property division and, therefore, exceeded the trial court's
post-judgment jurisdiction under Family Code section 9.007.415 The court
used this same reasoning to invalidate the arbitration agreement, which
the parties had agreed would not be binding, but had been incorporated
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. Civ. P. 329b.
DeGroot, 260 S.W.3d at 661.
Id.
Id. at 663-64. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a, 329b(a), (g); TEX.
TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007
(Vernon 2006) ("[a] court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division of property
made or approved in the decree of divorce," and "[a]n order under this section that
amends, modifies, alters, or changes "the divorce decree's property division" is beyond the
power of the [divorce] court.").
415. DeGroot, 260 S.W.3d at 664; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007 (Vernon 2006).
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into the January divorce decree and held that the court had erred when it
denied the ex-wife's petition to enforce and her motion to enter a ODRO
because these orders were premised on the void January divorce decree. 4 16 Based on the conclusion that the January divorce decree was
void, the July decree was reinstated and the orders denying the wife's
petition to enforce and her motion to enter a QDRO were reversed and
417
remanded to the trial court.
After trial on remand, as well as several mandamus proceedings, the
former husband in Bufkin v. Bufkin 418 appealed for a second time arguing that the second trial erred in: (1) finding that a loan obligation was a
community debt; (2) excluding expert testimony and rebuttal evidence
pertaining to the value of the husband's ranch; (3) awarding dividend income to his wife; and (4) excluding evidence of fault. The former wife
appealed on unrelated grounds. The Dallas Court of Appeals overruled
all points and affirmed the second divorce decree. 4 19 In the judgment in
the second trial, the wife was awarded community property in stock dividends, valuation increases in real property, a residence, and a ranch. The
focus of the case was the parties premarital agreement stipulating that all
property owned before marriage or acquired in the first five years of marriage would be the separate property of the acquiring spouse. 420 The
agreement also provided that a community property estate would not
arise until after their fifth wedding anniversary. The agreement stated
that "income from all sources, from personal services, [and] separate
property... all property increases in kind or in value of property that is
the product of either party shall become the community property of the
parties provided that it is acquired or produced from and after such
date .... ",421
The first trial court declared the residence, ranch, and stock at issue
was the separate property of the husband, and the judge's pre-trial order
was incorporated into the first decree-that any increase in the husband's
separate property was not community property as provided in the marriage contract. The wife appealed to the El Paso Court of Appeals, which
held that their contractual language stating that all increases in value of
property acquired or produced after the fifth year of marriage would be
community property was sufficient to embrace increases in the value of
stock. 422 The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
rebut a de minimis argument. 423 While on appeal, it was agreed that the
wife would narrow her appeal to "(1) whether the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment, and (2) whether [the trial court] erred in
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

DeGroot, 260 S.W.3d at 664-65.
Id. at 666.
259 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349.
Id.
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dividing the community estate by not including the increase in value of
[certain stock]. ' 42 4 The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed with the El Paso
425
Court's interpretation of the agreement.
On remand, both parties argued breach of the antenuptial agreement
and asserted claims for reimbursement and injunctive relief. 42 6 The jury
made findings that (1) the value of the particular stock of the husband
had decreased substantially from the fifth anniversary to the divorce; (2)
the value of the husband's other stock was zero and had been since the
fifth anniversary; and (3) the value of the residence and the ranch had
427
increased between the fifth anniversary and the date of the divorce.
The jury also found a bank debt of $835,983 to be assumed in half by each
party.428 The husband disputed the amount of the debt, while the wife
disputed the jury's findings of the husband's stock valuation as well as the
jury's finding on the assumption of debt by each party. The trial court
disregarded the fact-finding pertaining to the assumption of debt by each
429
party but adopted all others.
The second divorce decree awarded the wife $302,010, representing
one-half of the increase in value of the residence and ranch and $124,659
in prejudgment interest. 430 The second decree also went on to state that
no prior attorneys' fees would be reimbursed. The decree also incorporated the findings that the husband's stocks had not appreciated in value
and eliminated any award of stock dividends to the wife. Finally, the decree ignored the jury findings 1on the assumption of debt and charged the
43
entire debt to the husband.
In his appeal the husband argued that the agreement made during the
first appeal limited the issues to the divisions of increase in his particular
stock. The El Paso Court of Appeals determined that once evidence of
an increase in the value of the stock was found, it had to remand for
division of the entire community estate. 432 The Dallas Court of Appeals
agreed, observing that appellate courts cannot reverse single items of
property division and must remand the entire community estate for
434
redivision. 433 The husband's argument was thus overruled.
The husband also argued that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of his real estate appraiser pertaining to the value of the ranch
and residence. The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that the trial
court's ruling would be upheld if there was any legitimate basis for the
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
S.W.3d
434.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
863
Id.

at 350.
at 349.

at 350.
(citing Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985); Schlafy v. Schlafy, 33
872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)).
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ruling. 435 The court went on to observe that if the foundation-data underlying an expert's testimony was unreliable, the expert would not be
permitted to express any opinion on that data because such an opinion
would be similarly unreliable. 436 In this case the husband had asked his
expert to value the land without the value of the timber. Instead, the
expert was asked to incorporate the value of a timber appraiser in that
regard. The expert, however, admitted that such a valuation failed to
conform to the mandatory provisions of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 437 The husband failed to present any subsequent evidence supporting the reliability of a third party timber appraisal,
and the court therefore concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
43 8
discretion.
The court also dismissed the husband's argument that he had been
precluded from presenting "rebuttal testimony" considering the value of
the ranch. The court found that the evidence did not support the husband's argument and that he, in fact, had ample opportunity to rebut the
wife's valuations upon cross-examination but declined to do so.439
The court put aside the husband's argument that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence of fault. 440 The El Paso Court of Appeals held, and
the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed, that the language of the antenuptial
contract expressly provided for the division of property in the event of a
divorce. 441 Having so contracted, the parties were said to have precluded
consideration of fault, and fault was therefore irrelevant. 4 42
The court dismissed the husband's argument that the trial court erred
in granting the wife's request to disregard the jury finding pertaining to
the assumption of debt. The jury found that $835,983 of debt was to be
assumed by both parties. 4 43 The court noted that the debt was incurred
through the use of the husband's separate property as collateral. Further,
the antenuptial contract declared that "all liabilities benefiting separate
property shall be assumed by the owner of the separate property. ' 444 The
court found no evidence that the debt was used to benefit the community
or pay for living expenses and concluded that the contract dictated that
the debt be assumed by the husband as owner of the separate property. 445
The court overruled the wife's argument that the second trial court
erred in refusing to disregard jury findings as to the value of the hus435. Id. at 351 (citing Interstate Northborough P'ship v. Texas, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex.
2001); Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995) (for the first proposition);
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998) (for the second
proposition)).
436. Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997)).
437. Id. at 351-52.
438. Id. at 352.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 353.
441. Id.

442. Id.
443. Id. at 349.
444. Id. at 353.
445. Id.

2009]

Husband and Wife

1195

band's stock as well as the value of the ranch. 446 The court observed that
the standard for such a review is whether or not the record contains more
than a scintilla of evidence supporting the jury's findings. 447 The wife had
attempted to introduce a stipulation in the form of a post-verdict motion
made by the husband in which he estimated the value of the ranch as
lower than the jury's assessment, which would have assured the wife a
larger community interest. The court rejected this argument and noted
that to be enforceable, a stipulation must be in writing, signed, and filed
448
as part of the record, or made in open court and entered of record.
The court noted further that a stipulation must be an express agreement
that could not arise by implication from a post-verdict statement and that
even if there were such an agreement, that agreement would not be construed as an admission of a controverted fact at trial. 449 The court also
dismissed the wife's argument that the trial court erred by not disregarding the jury's findings on the value of particular stock. This argument was
apparently based in part upon the fact that the husband, as owner of the
stock, was able to offer his opinion as to its value and the jury had found
the husband's testimony more persuasive than that of the wife's expert.
The court also pointed out that a jury is not required to adopt an expert's
4 50
value and may sift the evidence as it sees fit.
Finally, the court considered the prejudgment interest awarded to the
wife in the second decree. The husband argued that the award was erroneous because there was no identifiable amount due and that the wife's
claim was one arising in equity requiring a specific pleading. 45 1 The wife
responded that the prejudgment interest resulted from the antenuptial
contract, though it was undisputed that the contract did not provide for
such a recovery. 452 The court determined that there were only two
grounds for obtaining such an award-an enabling statute or general
principles of equity. As on the first, the court noted that the statute governing prejudgment interest in the Texas Finance Code specifically provides prejudgment interest in specific situations that do not include cases
not involving credit. 453 Thus, no prejudgment interest was appropriate in
this case. Further, to prevail under general principles of equity, it is necessary to plead the desired relief with particularity, and the wife had
446. Id. at 355-56.
447. Id. at 354.
448. Id. at 355 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 11).

449. Id.
450. Id. (citing Gulf States Util. Co. v. Low, 779 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex. 2002) (for the
proposition that an owner may express an opinion about his property's value); State Farm,
Fire & Cas. Co., 88 S.W.3d 313, 321 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2002, pet. denied) (for the

proposition that the jury may sift the evidence)).
451. Id. at 356. The husband's claim of reimbursement in this instance was, of course,
inaccurate.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 357 (citing de la Garza v. de la Garza, 185 S.W.3d 924, 927-29 (Tex. App.Dallas 2006, no pet.) (for both the proposition that the Texas Finance Code now governs,
and the further proposition that the Code is silent on non-credit contract cases)).
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failed to do so. 454 The court of appeals, thus, reversed the judgment pertaining to the award of prejudgment interests and affirmed the remainder
of the trial court's judgment. 455

454. Id. at 358.
455. Id.

